Reactor Protection Systems for Nuclear
INTRODUCTION
The Reactor Protection System -II (RPS-II) provides both steady state and transient protections for the reactor core and primary coolant system by initiating a trip of the control rods when plant variables indicate that it is necessary. The first function of the RPS-II, that of the steady state protection, is based on three safety limits:
1. The reactor coolant system pressure must be limited to the transient pressure allowable under the ASME code (110% of design pressure). 2. The Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio (DNBR) must be maintained at or above 1.30.
3. The maximum linear heat rate (KW/ft) in the core must not exceed centerline fuel melt limits. Of these safety limit parameters, only the reactor coolant pressure is directly measurable; the linear heat rate and DNBR must be determined from combinations of parameters that can be measured directly. By monitoring these measurable parameters, the proximity to the specified safety limits can be determined and a reactor trip initiated when required. The second function of the RPS-II is to limit the severity of reactor transients to acceptable levels. Reactor Protection criteria are established for each accident that is reported in the Safety Analysis Report.
The RPS-II initiates a reactor trip whenever a trip is required to terminate a transient without violating the applicable reactor protection criteria. The steady state and transient protection in the RPS-II are provided with both analog and digital trip Lunctions. The simple trip functions are performed with standard analog hardware. The more complex trip functions are performed with a micro-computer. This hybrid system provides a higher degree of equipment diversity than was available in previous designs and, at the same time, provides a more accurate computation of limiting safety conditions. SYSTEM 
DESIGN
The RPS-II consists of four (4) These circuit breakers form a (1) out of (2) taken twice logic for tripping the control rods ( Figure 2 ) ( The a term defines a maximum allowable power level for which the DNBR remains above 1.30assuming O%offset and 100% reactor coolant flow.This limit is based on reactor outlet pressure and inlet temperature
The a componentfixes the maximum value of the s) oin equation.This value is then reduced by the muLtiplier 6, which reduces the 4)seto as a linear function of the offset. For zer o set the S component equals one. For offsets greater than zero, the 4setpoint is reduced by a factor depending on the absolute value of the offset and the constant K5.
The y component further reduces the )setpoint to correct for low reactor coolant flow and neutron power measurement errors. The constant K6 is equal to 100 plus the neutron power measurement error. This will reduce the calculated 4 tpint by an amount equal to the maximum neutron power error to ensure that the calculation is conservative. A value for the flow term is assumed based on the number of operating pumps. This is the minimum steady-state flow for the observed RC pump status.
In addition, the assumed flow is reduced in a series of steps when the plant is operating with all pumps running and a single pump is lost. This is done to allow the control system to effect a plant power runback to a safe level. The assumed flow is reduced in steps of approximately one second duration, so that the assumed flow is always less than the actual flow. Figure 3 is a typical flow coastdown curve for the loss of one pump. The assumed flow is initially reduced after a delay time required todetect the loss of a pump and to transmit the information to the reactor protectionsystem. After this initial delay time, the assumed flow is always less than the actual flow. After the flow has been stepped down, the steady-stated flow for threepump operation is assumed in the calculations. er than the thermal power. The thermal power is proportional to the AT across the core (RC outlet temperature minus RC inlet temperature).
The Power/AT trip can detect this "leading flux" and trip the reactor much sooner than either the Overpower or High RC Pressure Trip. A trip is output when the neutron flux signal exceeds a fixed setpoint (equivalent to about 15% fullpower) and the core AT is below a fixed setpoint (equivalent to about 10% full power).
-RC Pump Status Trip The primary purpose of this trip is to provide rapid protection for severe reactor coolant pump coastdown accidents. The input is obtained from pump monitors that measure either power or current to the pump motor. When a lost pump is detected, a contact input is sent to the calculating module. A trip is output whenever only two pumps in one loop are running (2/0 condition), only one pump is running (1/0 condition), or no pumps are running (0/0 conditions).
CALCULATING MODULE HARDWARE DESCRIPTION
The calculating module (Figure 4) 
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The self tests include the part number check previously mentioned and, in addition:
VrefCheck-The V check is designed to detect ref failures in the analog to digital converter. This check is accomplished by sampling a fixed reference voltage signal on each program cycle. This reference voltage is then converted to a digital signal in the analog to digital converter and compared to a stored value. If the values differ by more than a predetermined amount, a trip will be output.
Stall Trip -The stall trip monitors the calculatine module for failures that could prevent completion of a program cycle. This trip is implemented by a timer, which is pulsed once each program cycle. If it is not pulsed, it will time out causing a trip of the calculating module. Execution Order Check -This is a check in each processor that insures correct communication. Processor B checks the order in which requests are received from Processor A and outputs a trip if requests are received in the wrong order. Processor A checks the data received from Processor B for "function numbers" that identify the data. If an incorrect function number is received, Processor A will output a trip.
Sum Check -The contents of ROM are summed continually and compared to a predetermined total. The sum check tests for changes in the stored program. If a change is detected, a trip will be output.
SOFTWARE TESTING
Most of the concern surrounding the use of computers in protection systems has been directed toward the reliability of the software.L. 2 Since the software represents a common element in all four channels, high reliability must be insured. The tests designed to detect software design errors are performed in two distinct phases: 1) Vendor testing and 2) Independent software verification. The vendor testing consists of a "simulation test" that tests all program paths on a mini-computer with a software package simulating the micro-computer operation. This verifies individual subroutine operation and tests some of the subroutine interaction. The next step in the vendor testing is "integration testing" that tests the implemented program directly on the calculating module. This test verifies the interaction of program subroutines and insures that the program operates properly with the actual hardware configuration. At this point the vendor has completed the testing and releases the software for an independent verification.
The independent software verification begins with a review of the requirements documents and the software description. This ensures that the requirements were correctly interpreted. All of the program testing is then performed directly on the implemented program in a calculating module. The first stage of testing is conducted by varying the inputs in steps over their full range and monitoring the outputs. At each step, the outputs are checked against the expected values before the inputs are changed to new values. The constants in the last ROM are also varied over their full range during this test. To ensure that this test thoroughly exercises the program a,program analyzer has been constructed to monitor the memory cells that the calculating module is addressing. This device creates a map of the program locations that are addressed. This map is then used to determine the effectiveness of the testing and new tests can then be devised to force the program through any untested paths. The calculating module is then connected to a plant simulator. A number of typical transients are run on the simulator to provide real time dynamic testing of the calculating module. This combination of vendor testing and an independent software verification provides very high assurance that the program will operate as intended when installed in the plant. 
